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 Politics is among other things the work of time – punctual and durational, falling 
with a fine (or terrifying) suddenness or nurtured in silence and slow time.  Perhaps only 
the most utopian or messianic forms of political thought have sought to unmoor 
themselves from temporality; their credibility as political models has been brought into 
question to the extent that this is the case.  But Keats’s orientation in time was from the 
beginning of his writing career vexed.  I refer not only to the legendary briefness of the 
poet’s life, his emulation of distant literary precursors, or even his remark (both 
admission and boast) that “I never know the day of the Month” (LJK, 2:15).  To these 
temporal complications one must add Keats’s intense fixation on the posthumous life of 
writing – a condition well analyzed in Andrew Bennett’s work, and more recently evoked 
in Stanley Plumly’s experiment in biography, Posthumous Keats.1  Keats records in his 
writing life the conditions of being both “too late” (too, too late for the fond believing 
lyre) and “too soon” (to cease upon the midnight with no pain).  As in many of the Odes, 
Keats in Hyperion makes this condition of uneasy suspension, between the too-late Titans 
and the Olympians to come, his first and – until rewriting the poem as The Fall – 
encompassing subject.  The poet is at once “belated,” in both Bloomian and broader 
historico-political terms, and makes his home in Derrida’s l’á-venir, the future-to-come.  
Oriented toward the inaccessible past, ever watchful of the shadows that futurity casts 
upon the present, Keats is fundamentally an untimely poet.  In what sense – or tense – is 
he then a political one?  
 One early, influential attempt to answer this question came from the poet’s close 
friend, mentor, and (later) memoirist, Charles Cowden Clarke.  In the 1861 
“Recollections of Keats,” first published in the Atlantic Monthly, Clarke affirmed Keats’s 
moral and political commitments with reference to the statement which, at least since it 
adorned the Art Treasures Palace of the 1857 Great Exhibition in Manchester, had 
become the slogan for the poet’s work.  Clarke writes:  “His own line was the axiom of 
his moral existence, his political creed: – ‘A thing of beauty is a joy forever” [sic].2  Like 
the nightingale “not born for death,” the beautiful object is oriented toward if not in itself 
possessing eternal life.  Beauty persists in defiance of time, bestowing “unto” us, in 
Keats’s insistent preposition from the prologue to Endymion, a shadow of plenitude that 
our own lives conspicuously lack (1:24, 31).  The life that “life” does not or cannot afford 
may yet be available in the luminous forms of art.  
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 For reasons that will appear obvious to readers of this journal, Clarke’s 
pronouncement has not consistently struck scholars as the most promising basis from 
which to begin to examine Keats’s orientation in historical time and politics.  In the not 
too distant past, Clarke’s statement could be understood as little more than the rhetorical 
flourish of one committed to asserting that Keats’s “creed” was not properly speaking 
“political” at all.  To Marjorie Levinson, for instance, whose assessment of the poet 
inaugurated an extraordinarily productive era in Keats scholarship, not Keats’s “principle 
of beauty” but his “suffered objectivity” was the master key to the poet’s politics.  For 
Levinson, the Keats who thus suffers is our angel of history as described by Benjamin – 
face turned to the past, blown irresistibly into the future – and, in the later work 
especially, reappears as the avenging angel who turns the instruments of domination 
against the culture that wields them.3  A postulate common in the boom years of the new 
historicism, best captured by Fredric Jameson’s famous remark that “History is what 
hurts,” maintained that the force of “history” is chiefly made manifest in forms of 
affective “hurt,” trauma, and so forth.4  Where this is the case, the beautiful may signify 
no more than as the possibility of momentary consolation or the utopianism of a 
perpetually deferred redemption of time.   
 Among those who by contrast have sought to deduce a Keatsian politics at least in 
part from the “principle of beauty” to which the poet was above all things dedicated, 
some consensus has emerged concerning Keats’s temporal relationship to the political.  
Whether this work takes its cue from Newell Ford’s description of Keatsian beauty as 
“prefigurative truth,” Paul de Man’s characterization of Keats’s imagination as largely 
“prospective” in its orientation, or Patricia Parker’s account of the “perpetual ‘à venir’ in 
Keats,” it is the forward-looking poet whose voice has most often been claimed for 
politics.5  Hazlitt’s Essay on the Principles of Human Action furnishes a guidebook for 
the ethical dimensions of this self-divesting orientation towards futurity; the negatively 
capable chameleon poet is hailed as its literary embodiment.  Keats’s poetry is often read 
as dedicated to working out a politics of futurity on aesthetic as opposed to rationalist 
grounds – its overarching project, “the invention of sensible forms and material structures 
for a life to come.”6  In the disinterest of its construction and disinterestedness of its 
apprehension, the fragile autonomy of the artwork suggests a model for a self and a world 
remade.  
 Or perhaps not.  That beauty is “only a promise of happiness,” as Alexander 
Nehamas (after Adorno, after Stendhal) has recently emphasized, is a salutary reminder 
of how fragile and provisional that promise is – indeed, how essential to the experience of 
beauty is the provisionally conceptual form that it takes.  Before affirming with Nehamas, 
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however, that “The pleasures of the imagination are pleasures of anticipation, not 
accomplishment,”7 one might ask whither flies the pleasure or “joy” that attends beauty 
amidst these promises of eventual realization, obligations to futurity, or anticipation of 
changes to come.  More pointedly, I mean to ask whether there are terms to describe the 
event and effect of beauty for which neither future-oriented “anticipation” nor anamnestic 
reflection on “accomplishment” are wholly adequate.  (Adorno, well known for often 
quoting Stendhal’s dictum that beauty is a promesse du bonheur, is I think closer to 
Keats’s point of view when he writes of the temporal duplicity of this experience:  
“beauty is perceived both as authoritatively binding and as something incomprehensible 
that questioningly awaits its solution.”8)  Beauty could not be a promise of happiness 
were there not some fulfillment of that promise, however delicately posited, from the 
start.  What follows will therefore pose the question, which I take to be an unresolved one 
in Keats’s work, of whether there can be a “politics of aesthetics” not solely reliant on the 
imaginative construction of futurity.  What politics, if any, are to be found in the 
ephemeral moments of “Beauty that must die,” snatched up and momentarily enjoyed in a 
world where a thing of beauty cannot keep her lustrous eyes, or new Love pine at them 
beyond tomorrow? 
 To ask the potential for discerning an aesthetic politics of the present is to come 
up against an array of critical thinkers who have characterized the “pure” present as the 
site where meaning, to say nothing of meaningful political engagement, is not.  For 
Marxist cultural theorists including Ernst Bloch, Jameson, and Harry Harootunian, the 
punctual present, or the point in time with neither tendency nor reference to past or 
future, is a moment in which substantive political thought and action is impossible.  
Jameson in particular has long characterized the experience of late capitalist modernity as 
a “reduction to the present,” the condition of a seemingly unremitting captivity to the 
“singular modernity” of capitalism’s globalizing movement.  So foreshortened, the 
“purely fungible present” is revealed as a site of stultifying vacancy, sheer terror, or 
both.9   
 In Romantic scholarship contemporary with Jameson’s work, and in an explicit 
challenge to materialist ideology critique, Paul Fry has for years attended to the shining-
forth of presentness in Keats (and more recently in Wordsworth).  In exemplary readings 
of “To Autumn,” first in 1980 and again in SiR’s “Keats and Politics” forum of 1986, Fry 
characterized Keats’s late masterpiece as the most perfect instance of what in A Defense 
of Poetry (1995) he named lyric “ostension.”  In the ode, Fry argued, poetic language 
shows forth as “the sound of being,” released at last from the burdens of signification in 
which being must ever conceptually declare itself a form of being-as:  “Here alone, if 
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ever, the English ode stands present to the voice it seeks.”10  That this release into 
presentness is accompanied in Fry’s view by “a release from the tyranny of history and 
the language that encodes it” is not incidental to my point.11  Indeed, Fry’s sense of 
Keats’s relative indifference to the state of human affairs in the present affirms rather 
than challenges a materialist understanding of the pure present as politically neuter, a 
suspension of meaning-making that may just as credibly be, in the event if not in the final 
analysis, a release from politics or at least from sociopolitical concern.  These critical 
approaches – historical-materialist on the one hand, deconstructive-phenomenological on 
the other, and otherwise diametrically opposed in their evaluation of the unadulterated 
present – converge on a present in which the twittering of swallows in the skies is 
perhaps less likely to be identified as the concluding image of “To Autumn” than as an 
emblem of activity on the micro-blogging site Twitter.  There, perhaps, in a conjunction 
of luminous and vacant momentariness, is the signature for an age of instant messaging 
and high-frequency trading:  a “reduction to the present” devoid of meaning or tendency, 
the site of language and experience absorbed thoroughly into an atmosphere of 
contemporaneity.12 
I do not intend here to worry the distinction, already considerably frayed in our 
post-postmodern moment, between the luminous moments of art and the vacuous 
measures of what Benjamin called “homogeneous, empty time.”  Nor do I intend to call 
into question the status of the “aesthetic” Keats by presenting him as an uncritical 
celebrant of the latter.  Instead, I mean simply to mark the degree of Keats’s attunement, 
however vexed, to conditions of contemporaneity across a presumed divide between 
moments acknowledged to be social or political and those more narrowly “aesthetic.”  
“The going[s] on of the world make me dizzy,” Keats once wrote (to George and 
Georgiana Keats, 16 December 1818, LJK 2:5).  Keats registers the force of this 
dizzying, unsettled present in the course of the “little politics” that he records for his 
brother and sister-in-law in a long journal-letter, written the day before he composed “To 
Autumn” (18 September 1819, LJK 2:192).  What may strike us in this well known, most 
explicitly political passage from Keats’s letters is not the stadialist political history that 
the poet advances (subject to accidents and interruptions but progressive in the main), nor 
even his supposition that “the pres’ent distresses of this nation are a fortunate thing” in 
potentially setting this historical progression to rights again.13  “I know very little of these 
things,” Keats writes; it is no insult to the poet to presume that he was correct in this 
assessment (LJK 2:193). 
Quite apart, however, from any world-historical tendency that the contemporary 
moment might disclose – excepting perhaps the temporal “tendency” of transience itself – 
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Keats is keenly alive to the passing of events whose momentariness, though undeniable, 
may not tell the whole story.  He writes:  “There are little signs whereby we may know 
how matters are going on.”  (The letter in Keats’s hand, silently corrected by Rollins in 
his edition of the Letters, reads, “we many know how matters are going on” [my 
emphasis].  I think this construction at least plausibly admissible as the correct reading of 
Keats’s sentiment.14)  Among these “little signs” of the present time Keats includes the 
ongoing, well-publicized sedition trials against the publisher Richard Carlile, and the 
reception of Henry Hunt in London following his arrest in the wake of Peterloo. What 
amount of time would be required to give an adequate reckoning of these events, even 
assuming that one was capable of doing so?  Keats lingers on these moving moments, in 
both senses of that phrase, as “little signs” of potentially infinite resource, rifts loaded 
with ore.15  To come at last to the point:  the event of beauty consistently affords in Keats 
an opening onto the aliveness of the present time; it sharpens focus on the fragile 
ontology of the “now.”  In Keats’s terms, beauty lets us see how matters are going on.  
This is a distinctively minor, resolutely “little politics,” attuned to events and experiences 
that are neither codified nor wholly codifiable in terms given by the units of historical 
time.  In view of the fact that “apparently small causes make great alterations,” however, 
it may be precisely these “little signs” that turn out to matter; the little that we may (or we 
many) know may turn out to be enough (LJK, 2:194). 
 If there is to be an aesthetic politics of the present in Keats, let the following 
testimony, from the famous letter to Bailey of 22 November 1817, serve as its 
abbreviated manifesto.  Bailey had recently suffered professional disappointment (he had 
hoped to take up a curacy in Lincolnshire), harsh treatment by the notoriously prickly 
Haydon, and the experience of being “rack’d” in love.  Keats’s consolatory letter 
contains, characteristically, a good bit of affectionate teasing: 
 you have perhaps at one time thought there was such a thing as Worldly 
 Happiness to be arrived at, at certain points of time marked out – you have of 
 necessity from your disposition been thus led away – I scarcely remember 
 counting upon any Happiness – I look not for it if it be not in the present hour – 
 nothing startles me beyond the Moment. (LJK 1:186). 
With what may seem like cavalier disregard for Bailey’s faith and chosen profession, 
Keats dismisses the idea of modeling “Worldly Happiness” on providential time, as 
something to be fulfilled at a future point of time “marked out.”  Keats’s claim for the 
eudaemonia in and of “the present hour” is based on his conviction of the impossibility of 
fulfillment at any other time.  His famous exclamation from the same letter – “O for a life 
of Sensations rather than of Thoughts!” (LJK 1:185) – is both an appeal and an 
  Jackson 6 
acknowledgement of how impossible is that which is at the same time utterly necessary, 
the condition of being fully present to the present.16  Life that extends “beyond the 
Moment” (the isolated unit of time and the present instant in time) is not alive enough. 
 Keats’s conviction that happiness is not something to be “counted” on, that 
plenitude and delight befall us only in the transient moment, helps explain the avidity 
with which the poet famously appropriates Hazlitt’s conception of “gusto” as a signal 
excellence of art and aesthetic enjoyment.17  For Keats, the experience of beauty is 
something to be seized and quite literally capitalized upon (“an artist must serve 
Mammon,” Keats advises Shelley in a famous late letter), its resources plundered or 
stockpiled against its inevitable vanishing (LJK 2:322).  From this conviction proceeds 
all the images of seizing, glutting, and gorging for which Keats is justly remembered as 
England’s most sensuous poet.  “What the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth,” 
Keats writes to Bailey (LJK 1:184).  “Then glut thy sorrow on a morning rose” (“Ode on 
Melancholy”).  Milton in Paradise Lost “sees Beauty on the wing, pounces upon it and 
gorges it to the producing his essential verse.”18  Only in the rarest and most privileged 
moments does one experience the kind of delight in which “every sense / Fill[s] with 
spiritual sweets to plenitude, / As bees gorge full their cells” (Endymion, 3.38-40).  These 
various forms of sensory-aesthetic rift loading are means for weighting to the full an 
experience that can only be enjoyed in a fleeting instant. 
 Long before it became a cant phrase of the self-help industry, in other words, 
Keats grasped intuitively the plenitude and “power of now.”19  Of “Lamia,” Leigh Hunt 
writes:  “the lines seem to take pleasure in the progress of their own beauty, like sea-
nymphs luxuriating through the water.”20  Such wantonness of pleasure-taking, 
suggesting Byron’s charges of Keats’s onanistic style (and Levinson’s reading of the 
same), may be more usefully understood in relation to the poet’s tendency to find beauty 
in what Jerome McGann has called the “exquisite surfaces” and plentiful materiality of 
the poetic signifier.  The fruit of a second-generation Romanticism in McGann’s view (he 
finds its exemplar in Byron), this approach refuses the melancholy association of the 
beautiful with a lapsed, either vanished or perpetually deferred presence.  Beauty lives 
instead as the sensuous inscription on the surface of things, on open display such that its 
“material virtues” and temporal immediacies “be attentively marked.”21  “Now ‘tis a 
fairer season,” Keats writes in “Sleep and Poetry,” marking the advent of a season both 
productive of and responsive to the charms of “the fair” (221).  Keats’s “Now” is at once 
a performative utterance instantiating the speaker’s desire to “think away those times of 
woe” (220), and a descriptive, what Austin calls “constative,” statement marking a 
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change in the literary atmosphere since the waning of the so-called “French school” of 
poetic composition.22 
 Keats had more than one reason, of course, for thinking that the time of beauty is 
“now.”  A long critical tradition associates beauty with the immediate, ephemeral 
perception to which, as to the object associated with it, we give our automatic assent.  “It 
is but opening the Eye, and the Scene enters,” Addison writes in the first of his famous 
essays on the pleasures of the imagination; “It is not by the force of long attention and 
enquiry that we find any object to be beautiful,” writes Burke in the Philosophical 
Enquiry of 1759.  If, as Kant insisted in his early treatise on aesthetics, “a long duration is 
sublime,” then beauty (that must die) is perforce of short duration.  “A thing of beauty is 
a joy for such a little time,” attests the amorous moth in James Thurber’s fable.  If Keats 
did not know this statement to be commonsensically true he would not have insisted so 
forcefully on the reverse.23   
 One does not need to look far into Keats’s work to find evidence of how keenly 
felt was this temporal predicament.  The early poem to Clarke opens with the metaphor of 
a swan attempting to scoop up and preserve drops of water from the lake on which he 
glides: 
But not a moment can he there insure them 
Nor to such downy rest can he allure them; 
For down they rush as though they would be free, 
And drop like hours into eternity. (11-14) 
In Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso, the swan is the bird responsible for securing the 
immortality of selected dead, whose names, were it not for this intervention, one minute 
past and Lethe-wards had sunk.24  For Keats, however, the swan is not the helpmeet to the 
aspiring immortal poet, but his natural double:  “Just like that bird am I in loss of time, / 
Whene’er I venture on the stream of rhyme” (15-16).  The “loss of time” incurred in 
writing poetry suggests a wasteful, at once idle and profitless, expenditure of time; in a 
similar vein, Keats wishes that Clarke would not find “the reading / Of my rough 
verses…an hour misspent” (81-2).  Because the beautiful can be enjoyed only in isolated, 
luminous instants, the poet claims to lose in composition what was never truly possessed 
in the first place.  The moment is “moving, utterly free,” as Elizabeth Bishop writes in 
connection to another body of water, and the poet is too much in time to secure it.25 
 Keats’s reference to the “trembling diamond” of art (the inverse of Pater’s hard, 
gem-like flame), as well as his phonemic and metrical echoing in the lines above-quoted 
– “downy rest” / “down they rush” – suggest at once how close and how far are eternal 
possession of time and the condition of captivity to its downward rushing (20).  Like the 
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lover depicted on the Grecian Urn, the artist inhabits a world in which eternity is 
possible, if at all, only in the “before” or “after” of gratified desire.  The perception of 
eternity within the ephemeral was, as scholars have noted, a “common Romantic trope 
with, ironically, an enduring legacy.”26  But whereas Coleridge famously credits the poet 
with revealing “the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal,” insistent on 
the point of transparency where the distinction between temporality and eternity is 
nullified,27 Keats maintains an unbreachable distance between the two.  Eternity and the 
passing instant are connected in Keats’s work not by some implied equivalence but 
across the gap that separates them.  The wish expressed in the sonnet “To J.R.” – to “live 
long life in little space; / So time itself would be annihilate”– is “a happy thought,” to be 
sure, but not one given serious consideration by the poet who is as likely to repudiate as 
to indulge such fantasies (ll. 5-6, 14).  
 Whatever joy it holds forth in promise, then, the beautiful is decisively not for 
Keats, as it is for the neo-Platonists Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, a material emblem of 
eternal values.  “What the imagination seizes as Beauty” is a thing whose truth we are 
unable to doubt, “whether it existed before or not” (LJK 1:184).  Like Wordsworth, Keats 
is acutely conscious of the artifice required to produce even the most momentary 
experiences of immediacy in art.  The effort to give duration to the fleeting instant of 
beauty is an avowedly unnatural gesture never far removed from violence in Keats’s 
work; its signature mode is aggression (e.g., “This living hand”) or at best a stony 
indifference (“Cold Pastoral!”).  That eternal things thus scorn the living moments of the 
human beings who make or take pleasure from them reflects beauty’s ambivalent 
relationship to “the present hour” in which the poet lives.  For Keats, beauty reveals itself 
to the present moment without in any sense belonging wholly to it.  It intrudes on notice 
“in spite of” something (the unbeautiful in men, manners, times), or of everything:  “in 
spite of all, / Some shape of beauty moves away the pall / From our dark spirits” 
(Endymion, 1:11-13).  Of the “Fancy,” Keats writes:  “She will bring, in spite of frost, / 
Beauties that the earth hath lost” (ll. 29-30).  Aesthetic semblance, Schein, consists of a 
falsehood both necessary and inevitable. 
 Keats’s rebuke of the poet-handicraftsmen of the eighteenth century drew fire 
from several quarters, including from his erstwhile friend George Felton Mathew.  In 
notorious lines from “Sleep and Poetry” Keats attacks the insensibility of these 
poetasters, their Life of Thoughts rather than of Sensations:  “beauty was awake! / Why 
were ye not awake?” (192-3).  This is a particular failing of the “French school,” to be 
sure, but also a more general failure of recognition that few if any manage to escape.28  
Beauty’s blindingly obvious presence in the world is itself a rebuke of our inability, in all 
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but the most privileged moments, to perceive or appreciate it.29  “[T]he fresh to-morrow 
morn / Seems to give forth its light in very scorn / Of our dull, uninspired, snail-paced 
lives,” Keats writes in Endymion (4.23-5).  It follows as a matter of course that the 
“trembling delicate and snail-horn perception of Beauty,” for all the complicated mental 
operations that go into the production of this experience, is consummated in a moment 
out of keeping with our “snail-paced lives” (to Haydon, 8 April 1818, LJK 1:265).  The 
thing of beauty (the to-morrow morn) and the perceptual organ required to apprehend it 
(the snail-horn) are alike situated as if in advance of the self’s present experience.  Beauty 
is the experience of waking to a presentness that can at best be momentarily inhabited 
when the object urges us to it.   
 That the best of Keats’s sonnets reportedly written in a fifteen-minute contest 
with Hunt could make time in the course of its hasty composition to assert, twice, that 
“[t]he poetry of earth is never dead” may seem like a display of precisely the sort of 
bravado that I have suggested Keats rejects.  Isn’t Keats here, like Blake, purporting to 
hold Eternity in (a quarter of) an hour, laying claim to infinity in the little more than a 
minute per line allotted?  (By contrast,  Blackwood’s found “the fashion of firing off 
sonnets at each other” that prevailed among the Cockney poets an irritating sign of their 
enslavement to mere urban faddishness.30)  But Keats’s sonnet “on the Grasshopper and 
Cricket” makes plain that this perception of continuing presence – like that of beautiful 
thing whose “loveliness increases” – is founded on a partial misprision.  The cricket’s 
winter song makes “one in drowsiness half lost” mistake one season for another (13), and 
the grasshopper’s absence, like that of summer itself, may be felt sharpest when its song 
is replaced.  Though this sound comes to the drowsy listener like a recollection or 
anticipation, however, it is neither; it is, instead, wholly present.  The song persists as if 
in spite of the season, conjuring, as “Fancy” will do, “summer luxury…[o]n a long winter 
evening” (ll. 6, 10).  Beyond this falsehood, however, and indeed because of it, the 
singing of the cricket ratifies the claim that “the poetry of earth is ceasing never,” both in 
the warmth of its winter song and by suggesting to human listeners that “the 
Grasshopper’s among some grassy hills” (9, 14).  Neither “these” hills nor, certainly, 
“our” hills, but “some grassy hills.”  The radiant possibility that, as Larkin says, survives 
“undiminished somewhere,” is also sought and found in the time that we are given.31        
 
II. 
 The transience of beauty has been long regarded as an argument either for the 
necessity of its preservation (in poetry, by procreation) or for its thorough consumption 
and expenditure.  Time needs to be stored up or else used to the full lest beauty perish in 
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the moment of its enjoyment.  Shakespeare’s sonnets ring immortal changes on the 
former theme, and his Venus and Adonis presents a sustained treatment of the latter; 
consider lines where the goddess importunes the lovely though resistant youth:   
Make use of time, let not advantage slip, 
Beauty within itself should not be wasted. 
Fair flowers that are not gath’red in their prime 
Rot, and consume themselves in little time.32   
Venus’s counsel, here and throughout the poem, points to the range of “economic” 
activities – materialization and production, investment and consumption, stockpiling and 
display – entailed by the imperative to “make use of time.”  In a recent book, Anne-Lise 
François has called attention to literary texts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
especially that resist this charge, dispensing with the productionist demand to make time 
“count.”  Examining a host of Romantic and post-Romantic texts that “both record and 
accept a failure of telos” in a barely noticed passing of time or event, her work restores to 
a place of prominence a form of “uncounted experience” – incomplete, minimally 
defined, but nevertheless temporally fulfilled – on which it is unnecessary to act.  By 
means of such moments, François observes, “‘history’ – temporal change – can thus take 
place as a passing out of existence, a trailing off or lapse, rather than as a concretization 
or production of significance.” 
 Such instances as François describes of an “inverted carpe diem” are clearly allied 
to a negatively capable Keatsian aesthetics, and to an experience of beauty that, in the 
poet’s famous phrase, “obliterates all consideration” (LJK, 1:194).33  But Keats takes a 
circuitous path to the attainment of such inconsequence; he both inherits and modifies 
Shakespeare’s emphasis on the necessity of materializing and “making use” of transient 
experience.  The result is a carpe diem that blends rather than discriminates between the 
appropriation and expenditure of beauty, its thrifty preservation and heedless waste.  For 
Steven Knapp, the dialectical movement between self-dissolution and grasping 
appropriativeness constitutes a unique conception of “literary interest” in Keats’s work 
that the poet names “speculation.”  The signature of this speculative poetic mindset is a 
curious oscillation between the trancelike suspension of desire on the one hand and 
grasping miserliness on the other.34  Translating Knapp’s observation into more explicitly 
temporal terms, one can say that this latter, quasi-appropriative gesture is a “meantime” 
activity that seizes time in order to more perfectly yield to it.  Grasping is itself a way of 
letting time happen. 
 One finds a telling instance of the kind of oscillation Knapp describes in a passage 
from the first book of Endymion.  In the hero’s account of Cynthia’s appearance to him 
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and of the erotic encounter that motivates his quest, Keats offers a striking literalization 
of how imagination “seizes” or “gorges” on beauty as if mining a potentially 
inexhaustible resource: 
I was distracted; madly did I kiss 
The wooing arms which held me, and did give 
My eyes at once to death: but ‘twas to live, 
To take in draughts of life from the gold fount 
Of kind and passionate looks; to count, and count 
The moments, by some greedy help that seem’d 
A second self, that each might be redeem’d 
And plunder’d of its load of blessedness.  (1:653-60) 
Rarely has a lover or a poet served Mammon with such unrestrained zeal.  Caught up in 
his vision or waking dream, the hero of Keats’s latter-day “poetic romance” seeks “to 
feede his eye / And couetous desire with his huge threasury.” Endymion “counts” the 
passing moments of time with the same fervency as Spenser’s Mammon is shown 
counting money (“in his lap a masse of coyne he told”), and one hardly needs a Benjamin 
Franklin here to be reminded of the equivalence of these two commodities.35  
 However paradoxically Endymion pursues pleasures that are at once death and 
life to enjoy, the hero’s effort “to make the moments signify,” this “‘plundering’ which 
destroys the now of desire,” is not a laying-by of store for futurity.36  Nor certainly is it 
the case, as in Hazlitt’s moral philosophy, that the experience is self-interested in the 
present but disinterested with regard to a future state.  Though shadowed by the threat of 
their vanishing, such moments have no explicitly stated reference to the future.  To 
“give” oneself to the swooning death of the instant and “to take in draughts of life” from 
moments known in advance to be fleeting are two sides of the same coin.  In this sense, 
Endymion and his “greedy,” appropriative “second self” are both manifestations of the 
moment; they are two aspects of a contemporaneity divided in itself, two dialectically 
conflicted modes of occupying, living in and through, time.  Because happiness cannot be 
“count[ed] upon” in any time but the present hour, one must “count, and count / The 
moments” as they pass.  The accumulation of time against its imminent disappearance 
does not represent an effort to “still” time, however, so much as to render more precisely 
the experience of contingency and temporal flux.  
 Endymion is thus “distracted” in a precise etymological sense – divided, rent 
asunder – and suspended, as are many Keatsian figures in the instant of beauty’s 
perception, between the expropriative “giving” of oneself to the event and the “greedy” 
exercise of primitive accumulation.  This division of psychic labor between a subject who 
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at once surrenders wholly to the moment and a “second self” who seeks to “take in,” 
“count and count,” redeem and plunder transient moments is our clearest view to the 
irredeemably social character of beauty in Keats, its “impure” or historically conditioned 
response to a common temporal predicament.  The event of beauty is put under threat not 
exclusively by sociopolitical forces outside it, in other words, but in terms given by the 
avowedly fractured character of the perception itself.  That which is death to beauty, the 
encounter with its ugly other, is implicit within it.   
 To appreciate the force of this divided aesthetics we can look to Wordsworth’s 
powerful resistance to the rhythms of capitalist modernity, in comparison to which 
Keats’s hastily recruited “greedy help” could seem a passive adaptation, if not wholesale 
capitulation, to modernity’s temporal demands.  That moments could be “counted” with 
the same readiness as Mammon’s “masse of coyne” was after all possible only through 
the instruments of modern time-measurement – technologies of apportioning and 
regulating time which, as E.P. Thompson and others have taught us, became widespread 
in the late eighteenth century.  Thompson’s landmark essay on how the measures of 
abstract time “regulated the new rhythms of industrial life” concludes with Wordsworth’s 
polemic in The Prelude against those whom the poet punningly calls “watchful men / 
And skilful in the usury of time, / …who in their prescience would controul / All 
accidents.”37  In the face of contemporary craving for extraordinary incident (at no time 
more pronounced, the poet insists, than “at the present day”), Wordsworth fashions the 
first modern specimen of “slow art.”  The poetry thus created is short on “action and 
situation” (plot in the Aristotelian sense) but long on “feeling,” unsparing in its 
solicitation and at times peremptory demand on the reader’s cooperative exertion of 
passion and thought.38  This gleaning of the brain, nerves, and heart is by Wordsworth 
pointedly contrasted to labor that can be measured by the divisible units of abstract time.  
“Sleep in thy intellectual crust,” Wordsworth chides the “Moralist” in “A Poet’s 
Epitaph,” “Nor lose ten tickings of thy watch / Near this unprofitable dust.”39  The poet’s 
“dust” is not, he insists, wholly “unprofitable”; his grave is a space to rest or on which to 
“build thy house” (60).  But time cannot be turned to account in the units allotted for by 
the watch.  Who submits to the abstraction of clock time or worries about the probable 
yield of the future will not profit from it. 
 Keats’s identification of Endymion’s “greedy help” with a “second self” does not 
so much derive from Shakespeare’s image of devouring Night as “Death’s second self” 
as it alludes to Wordsworth’s “Michael,” the tale recorded “for the sake / Of youthful 
Poets, who among these Hills / Will be my second Self when I am gone.”40  For 
Wordsworth, the “Poet” is the figure in whom resides a power of resistance to the 
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otherwise relentless, two-handed engine of “modernity” and “progress”:  “in spite of 
things silently gone out of mind, and things violently destroyed, the Poet binds together 
by passion and knowledge the vast empire of human society, as it is spread over the 
whole earth, and over all time.”41  Keats’s account of beauty as inspiring us to wreathe 
“on every morrow… / a flowery band to bind us to the earth” is a principle taken on 
Wordsworth’s authority, as to a lesser extent is his sense that beauty makes its 
appearance “in spite of all” (Endymion, 1:6-7).  But Wordsworth’s second self is chiefly 
the embodiment of a redemptive wish (however minimally asserted that wish may be):  
he is the emblem of a future more like the past than the present is capable of being. 
However inspired by Wordsworth’s example, Endymion’s second self is actualized 
precisely in the present fragile moment of beauty, a “now” experienced and foreseen as 
continually slipping into the past.  The aesthetic artifice that in Wordsworth affords life 
and food for future years, promising the eventual re-establishment of a severed link to the 
past, chiefly and more modestly furnishes in Keats’s work a reason to keep moving in the 
present. 
It is indeed the “one bare circumstance” of Cynthia’s appearance that keeps 
Endymion moving through the “4000 Lines” that Keats plotted in advance for his longest 
work.42  In this respect, though not only so, the passage describing Enydmion’s vision has 
a metonymical relationship to the poem as a whole.  Northrop Frye remarks of Endymion 
that “The poem is devoted to the theme of realizing beauty, making it true by creating it.”  
I think it more accurate to say that Endymion – which admits doubts concerning the 
reality of the hero’s vision, but under no circumstances the authority or “truth” of beauty 
itself – is devoted to making the minimal event or “bare circumstance” achieve temporal 
duration in the present.43  Endymion’s oscillation between two competing temporal 
impulses – to take time and to yield to it – are alike dedicated to this end.  The poet sets 
out his production schedule in the prologue, and largely succeeds in keeping to this 
timeline, as adroit in the husbandry of time as any tenant farmer in the management of his 
crops.  Paradoxically, this exercise of severe time-management is designed to procure for 
“Lovers of Poetry…food for a Week’s stroll in the Summer,” a pastime more leisurely 
and of longer duration “than what they can read through before Mrs Williams comes 
down stairs [ – ] a Morning work at most” (to Bailey, 8 October 1817, LJK, 1:170).  To 
the finished work, the fruit of these conflicting temporal impulses, Keats appends to the 
poem an epigraph from Shakespeare’s sonnet 17:  “The stretched metre of an antique 
song.”  (Shakespeare “overwhelms a genuine Lover of Poesy with all manner of abuse,” 
Keats observes to Reynolds, before claiming the line as “a capital Motto for my Poem” 
[LJK 1:189]).  With the epigraph from Shakespeare, Keats says, “I will appear to have 
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worked in vain for what was in actuality given to me in plenty.  All this effort will seem 
to future ages as little more than an idealization of something that could never have been 
doubted at the time.”  Keats’s epigraph, which as elsewhere in his work acknowledges 
the impossibility of projecting beauty or happiness beyond “the present hour,” also 
indicates by negation the true authority of beauty’s perception in the moment. 
That the dilatoriness of Endymion’s narrative, its seemingly endless subplots and 
divagations, exist in the service of the sudden moment is clearest from Keats’s hastily 
executed conclusion to the poem.  In little more than 20 of Endymion’s 4000-plus lines, 
the Indian Maid transforms into Cynthia, Endymion is promptly “spiritualized,” and they 
vanish together leaving Peona in “wonderment” (4:993, 1003).  The profound anti-climax 
of the conclusion, withheld for so long, has bothered many readers of Keats’s work.44  
But we miss the point, I think, to regard the conclusion as a failure to achieve dramatic 
effect, as if Keats had merely bungled the ending or had (as he surely had) wearied of the 
poem in the course of its composition.  There is, it is true, at once an obvious and a 
scarcely tolerable abruptness to the consummation of Endymion’s quest.  However, this 
fact merely underscores the point that the quest has all along been for nothing more than 
what the hero has already enjoyed.  No amount of preparation or labor can alter the 
nature of the “unlook’d for change” that Endymion undergoes (4:992); all that waiting 
and striving must culminate in a workless instant, the inconsequence of which is 
paradoxically vouchsafed by the interested care of time that has gone into its production.  
Endymion’s ascension, an event witnessed though but dimly comprehended by Peona, 
represents neither a doleful chapter in the unfinished project of modernity (see Shelley’s 
Alastor, one of Keats’s immediate models) nor an elaborately reconciliatory climax 
hailing the triumphal end of time (see Prometheus Unbound, written a few years later).  
Precisely nothing is changed through this transfiguration, or everything is.  What, then, 
was it all for?  I suspect that the inclination to pose this question was of greater interest to 
Keats than any answer that he (or we) could possibly return to it.  “Was it a vision, or a 
waking dream?”; “It was no dream; or say a dream it was” (“Ode to a Nightingale,” 79; 
“Lamia,” 126). 
Endymion’s concluding moment of inconsequential fulfillment, its fulfillment of 
inconsequence, is therefore not “the herald, companion, and follower” of epochal 
transformation in the political world.45  But nor yet is it the momentary experience that 
comes and goes without a trace.  Burke writes:  “it is very evident that pleasure, when it 
has run its career, sets us down very nearly where it found us.”46  If Keats, insistent on the 
necessity of finding “Worldly Happiness” in the present, replies “not yet,” he does so 
  Jackson 15 
with the understanding that beauty’s effects may just as plausibly be ongoing, extending 
into a “now” whose terminus is yet to be ascertained.  The thing of beauty that remains 
unpredictable and not fully cognizable is also of uncertain duration; it outlasts “one short 
hour” because its resources have not yet been sufficiently plumbed (1.26).  This “bright 
something,” as Endymion calls it (1.602), thus survives as a site of contingency, vitality, 
and (indeed) promise – little signs of a contested present that is with us still.  
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